Ontological Nihilism

Introduction

Ontological Nihilism is the view that nothing exists. There is nothing at all. Neither things, nor objects, nor properties, nor events. When the ontological Nihilist says that there is nothing, they use the word “thing” in the broadest sense. Hence, Ontological Nihilism does not merely reject specific ontological categories such as material objects or abstract concepts; it extends to all conceivable forms of “being.” It claims that there are no objects, no properties, no events, no space–time, no structures, no facts or states of affairs, no appearances, no anything.

Hence, a commitment to this proposition entails one’s transcendence of typical metaphysical disputes, such as the debates between idealism and materialism,  realism and anti-realism, theism and atheism as Ontological nihilism denies the reality of anything that any of these positions could debate over.

Consistency of NIHILISM

An argument often advanced against Ontological Nihilism runs as follows: If ontological nihilism holds, the thought (or sentence or proposition) ‘nothing exists’ is true. But in this case, there is this very thought (proposition, sentence), so there is something. So ontological nihilism can’t hold. This argument doesn’t necessarily render nihilism inconsistent. If anything at all this argument does, is that it demonstrates that Nihilism, if true, is inexpressible. The existence of a thought expressing ontological nihilism entails its falsity. However, it does not create a logical inconsistency within the position. For inconsistency to arise, the truth of the claim “nothing exists” would need to imply its falsity.

The argument, again, highlights a potential tension in ontological nihilism by pointing out that if it is the case that the fact that nothing exists is true, then the “fact” of its truth would itself exist, seemingly contradicting the claim. However, it can be avoided  by treating the fact as as a linguistic convenience rather than an ontological commitment. Phrases like the fact that ontological nihilism is true simply represent a way of structuring language, not evidence of an actual entity called a “fact.”

Hence, the nihilist position is not immediately self-contradictory in a way that makes its truth entail its falsity.

AN ARGUMENT FOR THE CONSISTENCY OF NIHILISM

The argument for Nihilism is grounded in the premises of eliminativism and non-foundationalism. Eliminativist theories of x hold that xs do not exist. In the context of this argument, eliminativism must be viewed as the belief that only the fundamental exists, where ‘fundamental’ is to be understood as ‘not depending on anything else’.  ‘Dependence’ is here construed as existential dependence. Some entity p existentially depends on some entity q iff  q’s failing to exist entails p’s failing to exist.

Non-foundationlism asserts that there is nothing fundamental. Hence, there is no such p which is not existentially dependent on some q. Perhaps because there is an infinite chain of dependence relation, or because dependence relations are arranged in a circular structure. So, a combination of these theories yields the conclusion that nothing actually exists.

To put it formally:

• P1. If an entity is fundamental, it does not existentially depend on anything else.
• P2. There is no fundamental entity. All entities are existentially dependent on something else.
• C.  Since, no fundamental entity exists, nothing can exist independently. Hence, nothing exists.

A DEFEnse of the premises:

Eliminativism: Appeal to PARSIMONY

One reason for eliminativism is based on considerations of parsimony, id est “the simplest explanation is usually the best.” The idea is that a theory postulating only the fundamental entities, but not the dependent entities is more parsimonious and therefore to be preferred. This preference is due to the avoidance of ontological redundancy by such a theory. Given that ontology is not the study of all there is, but only of what there is in the most fundamental sense of existence, it is theoretically redundant to include the objects at the most basic level into our ontology. Just like we don’t want to include theorems in the axioms of a formal system, the eliminativist doesn’t want to include anything that can be derived in the real world. This approach is based on a pessimistic outlook towards hypostatizations, theoretical constructs that are taken ontologically seriously . The fewer assumptions a hypostatization has, the simpler it is. Eliminativism says that adding extra things  doesn’t give us any new explanations. So, a theory that only has the basic things is a better fit for simplicity. In this sense, eliminativism is preferable because it chooses simplicity by getting rid of unnecessary things that don’t help us understand or predict.

Eliminativism : A defense from Causal overdetermination

A second consideration in favour of eliminativism is connected with worries concerning causal overdetermination. Let’s take the example of a snowball breaking a window. We can describe this event in different ways: we could say that the snowball broke the window, or we could describe the event in terms of its fundamental parts viz. the ice-crystals, water molecules, or atoms involved. But the question is that are these just different ways of explaining the same event, or do they represent separate causal events happening simultaneously? If each of these levels (ice-crystals, water molecules, atoms) is independently sufficient to break the window, then we would have a case of causal overdetermination, meaning the event is being explained multiple times in a redundant way. This seems unnecessary. From an eliminativist perspective, these different levels of explanation might not be real, but are instead convenient ways of talking about the event. We don’t need to postulate all these entities as real, separate causal forces; the simplest explanation is that the snowball, when broken down to its smallest parts is the only level that really needs to be considered causally. Thus, only the fundamental entities should be considered real because they are the ones with true causal power.

Eliminativism : A defense from The non-existence of appearances

A third case can be made for eliminativism from the concept of non-existence of appearances. Often, when we recognize that something is just an appearance—like a bent stick in water or a mirage in the desert—we understand that the thing we perceive does not really exist. It is only an illusion or appearance that doesn't have real, independent existence.

The eliminativist believes that the same applies to all appearances, not just sensory illusions. If we accept that appearances are just illusions, then we have to let go of the idea that these appearances have an independent, real existence. Just like a mirage isn’t a real body of water, the things we perceive as “whole” entities aren’t really existing things, but just collections of parts. This rejection of appearances as real entities supports the eliminativist position: only the most basic, fundamental entities truly exist, and everything else is just a made-up thing or an appearance.

Non-foundationalism: Explanatory practice.

Non-foundationalism could easily be supported by a careful observation of science and explanation. Basically, regarding science, one is normally asked to refer to a lower level in every understanding level. This process of explanation does not end at basics but goes deeper into point-rich explanations that keep going without the end. What matters most is that every level has an explanation rooted in a lower level and has a stretched point that goes on forever. That internal point makes all levels of explanation take another level. Hence, after all those lines of explanation, that will be enough; no base or final one is required. There cannot be any fundamental level requirement, and the explanatory regress is just how we understand the world. Besides, it may not be too necessary or even a mistake to try to find a base level explanation for everything, says the non-foundationalist. It might be supposed that there's some metalevel onto which we can organize all our theories, but that might not even be the way things actually work in the world. Take a game of chess: the rules are contingent on the 8x8 grid. Within the game, it makes perfect sense, but it doesn't mean that the ultimate truth resides in that board itself. Likewise, we might search for a foundational level because it suits our understanding of how explanations should work, but it may not be something that actually exists in the world.

Non-foundationalism: Intrinsicality

Non-foundationalism can be supported by questioning the whole idea of intrinsic properties. Intrinsic properties are those that an object would have even if nothing else existed. Rest mass of an object is an intrinsic feature because it does exist whether there are any other objects in the universe. Though the conceived foundational objects suppose that these would be the only objects about which at least one intrinsic property can be said, such a self-sufficiency will assure the autonomous existence of these objects by independent other agents' exclusion. Now, if said foundational objects lack intrinsically any quality, then this, definitely, would undermine the existence of the very idea called the fundamental level of reality. The very foundation of existence would be challenged without these objects that can stand alone, independent of everything else.

Moreover, non-foundationalism can suggest that such dependence among properties could be not a drawback, but a character of the way objects exist. Properties are identified by the roles they playin the laws of nature. For instance, being an electron is not an intrinsic property in isolation but is defined by how electrons behave in relation to other entities and laws. Thus, non-foundationalism suggests that objects do not need intrinsic properties to exist in the most fundamental way.

Non-foundationalism: Structuralism and contextualism

A third set of arguments for non-foundationalism is based on structuralist and contextualist considerations. If we believe that everything depends on some other thing we might then be wary to accept that this fact depends on nothing whatsoever. Once this is denied, however, foundationalism can no longer be maintained, for every statement about the world will depend on some other statements, and there can be no base level that exists in an independent manner.

Non-foundationalism is also driven by ideas from semantic contextualism. If a contextualist thinks that each statement can only be true or false in relation to other statements that are assumed to be true, then no statement can be completely independent of all others. This means there can’t be a precise description of the ultimate level of existence using just statements.

CONCLUSION

It is not the case that just because eliminativism and non-foundationalism are coherent ideas in some areas of philosophy, one should mix them together in the metaphysics of Nihilism. Even if eliminativism is a viable option, like in the philosophy of mind, that doesn’t mean one should adopt it as a metaphysical position. The argument is that these reasons can make a metaphysician think about eliminativism or non-foundationalism. If someone takes both sets of reasons seriously, they should take both. And if they do, nihilism will follow.

Let me know what you think. Is Nihilism True?